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Algorithms have played an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they becoming 
faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to 
significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have been raising concerns 
not only over the rights to privacy and consumers’ autonomy, but also on competition. 
Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. 
However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play 
as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated 
algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of pricing strategies, learning to collude 
without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that 
the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of 
borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities 
for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have 
also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms 
used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option 
faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment 
may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges face by current software testing 
methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an 
interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics. 
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Algorithms have played an increasingly important role in economic agents’ decision making and 
in economic activity in general2. They have been present in some markets and industries for a 
long time: in finance and banking, insurance, airlines, food retail, e-commerce, and in many 
other industries. However, their use is becoming widespread, especially across more advanced 
economies, namely in e-commerce and in the definition and implementation of pricing 
strategies in general, as algorithmic pricing software becomes increasingly affordable even to 
smaller businesses3. Moreover, algorithms are becoming faster and smarter which, together 
with the increasing use of ever larger data sets by market participants, may lead to significant 
changes in the way markets work4. 
The use of algorithms by suppliers and consumers can both benefit and hurt consumer welfare5. 
For example, by reducing information and transactions costs, e.g., by making widely available 
product comparison sites, they allow disposable income to go further, enabling more consumers 
to consume more and make better choices. On the other hand, through the use of ever 
increasing big data sets on individual consumers’ habits and behavioral patterns, algorithms can 
increase the scope for personalized pricing by suppliers, leading to a larger appropriation of 
consumer surplus, even if such personalized pricing may render price collusion less attractive 
and more difficult to sustain in equilibrium. 
These developments have been raising some concerns not only over the rights to privacy and 
consumers’ autonomy, but also over the way markets work and on the level of competition they 
can sustain. 
Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. As an 
example, recall the Airline Tariff Publishing Case, dealt with by the US Justice Department and 
settled with a consent decree in March 1994, eight major US airlines colluded to raise prices and 
restrict competition in the airline industry. Collusion was sustained through the transmission of 
relevant information via the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATPCO), such as information on 
‘first and last ticket dates’ and on ‘first and last travel dates’6.  
                                                          
2  An ‘algorithm’ can be defined as a finite sequence of instructions, expressed in a precise based upon a certain 
alphabet, such that, when confronted with a question of some kind and carried out in the most literal- minded 
way, will invariably terminate, sooner or later, with the correct answer. Notice that this does not constitute a 
mathematical definition. There is no agreed upon mathematical definition of ‘algorithm’. Sometimes the term 
‘effective procedure’ is used instead of the term ‘algorithm’. 
3  Amazon, Google, Microsoft and other companies supply off-the-shelf machine learning solutions and computing 
capability - see, E. Calvano et al. (2018a). 
4  As pointed out by Petit (2017), a common thread to the emerging literature on Antitrust and Artificial Intelligence 
Literature (AAI), is to describe the increasing use of algorithms on markets as a ‘game changer’. 
5  On the use of algorithms by consumers, and its effects on markets and welfare, see Gal & Elkin-Koren (2017). 
6  As reported in the March 18th, 1994, issue of The New York Times, «Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General 
in charge of the antitrust division, said the airlines used the Airline Tariff Publishing system “to carry on 
conversations just as direct and detailed as those traditionally conducted by conspirators over the telephone or in 
hotel rooms. Although their method was novel, their conduct amounted to price-fixing, plain and simple," she 
said». According to S. Borenstein (2004), «While an agreement among competitors to fix prices is per se illegal, 
computer technology that permits rapid announcements and responses has blurred the meaning of “agreement” 
and has made it difficult for antitrust authorities to distinguish public announcements from conversations among 
competitors» - See also J. Klein (1999). The Airline Tariff Publishing system is the property of the Airline Tariff 
Publishing Company (ATPCO) a corporation owned by several airlines, formed to serve as agent for those owners 
(and for other airlines or vendors) to file and publish tariffs and related products. It operates as a clearinghouse 
for distribution of fare change information. At least once a day ATPCO produces a compilation of all industry fare 




In the more recent US v. David Topkins Case, a US District Court ruled that Title 15, US Code, 
Section 1, had been violated. David Topkins apparently had coded an algorithm that enabled 
him and his co-conspirators to agree to fix the prices of certain posters sold in the US through 
Amazon Marketplace7. 
In December 2015, a UK citizen was indicted for an allegedly similar price fixing strategy applied 
to posters sold through the online site Amazon Marketplace. The indictment, unsealed on 
December 4th and originally filed in the Northern District of California on August 27th, 2015, 
names the UK citizen Daniel Aston and his company named ‘Trod’, doing business as ‘Buy 4 Less’, 
as conspiring to fix prices for online posters sales from September 2013 to January 2014. 
According to Aston’s indictment, he used commercially available algorithm-based pricing 
software to fix the prices of posters sold on Amazon Marketplace8.  
In the Eturas Case (Case C-74/14), the European Court of Justice (CJEU) dealt with concerted 
practices between travel agents through the use of an online platform. The alleged coordination 
would have taken place via an online travel booking system (E-turas, owned by Eturas) used by 
more than 30 travel agents in Lithuania. The Lithuanian Competition Council (LCC) imposed fines 
on Eturas and these 30 travel agencies for applying a common cap on discounts applicable to 
services provided through the Eturas online booking platform. The discount cap was 
communicated to the agencies through an internal messaging system in the form of an 
amendment to the platform terms and conditions. It was then implemented by Eturas using 
technical means9. 
Online platforms may facilitate an unlawful cooperation between platform users without 
involving their direct contact. These examples may involve the use of ‘adaptive algorithms’, to 
borrow a terminology used in E. Calvano et al. (2018a)10. 
The greatest concerns recently expressed in the literature on competition law and policy relate: 
(i) to the role algorithms in general can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated 
games11, and (ii) the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can come to play as autonomous 
implementers of pricing strategies which, through their strategic interaction and their access to 
large data sets (made up of market information on prices, sales, and other relevant variables for 
                                                          
change information and sends the computer file, containing thousands of fare changes, to a list of recipients that 
includes all major airlines and the computer reservations systems operating in the US – see S. Borenstein.  
7  Ruling by the US District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, April 2014.  
8  For this case involving Daniel Aston, see MLex, 26 Feb 2016. 
9  See http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2017/01/19/eturas-conclusions-platform-collusion/. 
The authors of this blog rightly claim that «(…) the Eturas decision demonstrates how information technology can 
distort markets in the digital space.» 
10   As described by Calvano et al. (2018a), an ‘adaptive algorithm’ incorporates a model of the market and seek to 
maximize the firm’s profit. An example is provided by ‘dynamic pricing for revenue management’, used in hotel 
booking and airline services. It may estimate market demand using data on sold quantities and prices, and then 
will estimate the optimal price given the estimated demand and the firm’s rivals past behavior (prices charged, 
etc).  
11  See Mehra (2016) for a thorough discussion of the role played by “robo-sellers”. The author adds that «The rise 
of the robo-seller exacerbates antitrust law’s longstanding weakness at addressing social harm from oligopoly. 
Black-letter law’s blind spot when it comes to independent price coordination—that is, without overt acts such as 
communication or the adoption of facilitating practices—may become a cloaking device behind which algorithmic 
price coordination can readily hide. Additionally, the challenges that face explicit collusion by oligopolists may 
become easier to surmount with mass data collection and algorithmic assistance.» I believe this assertion calls for 
further work. As stated by McSweeny (2017), «We have a lot to learn about the effects of pricing algorithms and 
AI. Further research will contribute to better and more effective competition enforcement in this area.» 




the definition and implementation of pricing strategies), become capable of adapting over time 
and of learning to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents12 13. In 
particular, it is recognized that the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and 
lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion14, as they are not 
programmed with the intent of converging to a collusive equilibrium outcome but can reach it 
through learning and intelligent adaptation15. Moreover, their choices, namely of pricing 
strategies, and subsequent implementation, would be unencumbered by moral and ethical 
considerations and constraints, or other human behavioral “biases”, unlike the case with human 
economic agents16. In this sense, the evolution of artificial intelligence is bringing once more to 
the fore the persistently controversial distinction between tacit and explicit collusion. A 
distinction that may be of little consequence in economic theory but is very relevant in 
competition law and policy17. 
At least part of the competition law and economics community recognizes this challenge, to the 
point of questioning whether the existing antitrust regimes across many jurisdictions are 
capable to meet it18. For example, it has been pointed out that antitrust legislation was drafted 
                                                          
12  Competition issues raised by this type of algorithms have been analyzed by Ezrachi & Stucke (2015), namely under 
the categories of collusion they call “Predictable Agent” and “Autonomous Machine”.  
13  Quoting the OECD Report (2017) «Artificial intelligence [AI] refers to the broad branch of computer science that 
studies and designs intelligent agents, who should be able to carry out tasks of significant difficulty in a way that 
is perceived as “intelligent”. (…) At the initial stages of AI, machines were programmed with extensive lists of 
detailed rules in order to attempt to replicate human thoughts, which could easily become a burdensome process. 
AI became a more effective tool after the development of algorithms that teach machines to learn, an idea that 
evolved from the study of pattern recognition and learning theory, and which would establish the new branch of 
machine learning. Machine learning (ML) is a subfield of AI which designs intelligent machines through the use of 
algorithms that iteratively learn from data and experience. (…) machine learning gives “computers the ability to 
learn without being explicitly programmed”. Machine learning algorithms can be classified into three broad 
categories, depending on their learning pattern (Anitha et al., 2014): (i) Supervised learning, where the algorithm 
uses a sample of labelled data to learn a general rule that maps inputs to outputs; (ii) Unsupervised learning, 
where the algorithm attempts to identify hidden structures and patterns from unlabeled data; (iii) Reinforcement 
learning, where the algorithm performs a task in a dynamic environment, such as driving a vehicle or playing a 
game (…) and learns through trial and error.» 
14  Following OECD (2017): «Economists usually distinguish between two forms of collusion, explicit and tacit. Explicit 
collusion refers to anti-competitive conducts that are maintained with explicit agreements, whether they are 
written or oral. The most direct way for firms to achieve an explicit collusive outcome is to interact directly and 
agree on the optimal level of price or output. Tacit collusion, on the contrary, refers to forms of anti-competitive 
co-ordination which can be achieved without any need for an explicit agreement, but which competitors are able 
to maintain by recognizing their mutual interdependence. In a tacitly collusive context, the non-competitive 
outcome is achieved by each participant deciding its own profit-maximizing strategy independently of its 
competitors. (…) Contrary to the economic approach, which considers collusion a market outcome, the legal 
approach focuses on the means used by competitors to achieve such a collusive outcome. For this reason, 
competition laws generally do not prohibit collusion as such, but prohibit anti-competitive agreements. If collusion 
is the result of such as agreement then an infringement of the law can be successfully established. Although there 
is great variance in how jurisdictions interpret the notion of agreement, they traditionally require some sort of 
proof of direct or indirect contact showing that firms have not acted independently from each other (the so-called 
“meeting of the minds”).» For an economic analysis of ‘tacit collusion’, see Ivaldi et al. (2003). See also Kaplow 
(2011). 
15  See T. Klein (2018) for an example of how autonomous ‘Q-learning algorithms’ are able to achieve supra-
competitive profits in a stylized oligopoly environment with sequential price competition. See also Calvano et al. 
(2018a).   
16  Unless and until algorithms may be so sophisticated as to take into account ethical and moral considerations. In 
any case, it is certainly already possible to program algorithms to take into consideration certain simple ethical 
rules such as “split the gain in half”. 
17  See e.g., Kaplow (2011). 
18    As referred by Kroll et al. (2017): « (…) the accountability mechanisms and legal standards that govern decision 
processes have not kept pace with technology. The tools currently available to policymakers, legislators, and courts 




having human agents in mind. Concepts such as “meeting of the minds”, “mutual 
understanding”, “mutual assent”, “concurrence of wills”19, can hardly be applied to the case of 
autonomous artificial agents20, if they cannot be regarded as mere tools used by firms 
(otherwise firms would undoubtedly remain liable for their own collusive behavior), but behave 
as truly autonomous agents21. As pointed out by McSweeny (2017), «Concerns about algorithmic 
tacit collusion are still largely theoretical at this point. Nonetheless, recent examples suggest that 
the concern is not fanciful.» 
The challenge goes beyond liability. For example, the EU can assert that «(…) companies should 
ultimately be held responsible for the activities of any algorithm or pricing software they deploy», 
and that «like an employee or an outside consultant working under a firm’s ‘direction or control,’ 
an algorithm remains under the firm’s control, and therefore the firm is liable for its actions.»22 
But that does not prevent that the use of increasingly sophisticated algorithms will make 
collusion more difficult to detect and prosecute, even if the design and use of algorithms may 
be regarded as a ‘plus factor’ to ‘an agreement’ between firms employing such algorithms23. 
 
II. Algorithmic Collusion 
The use of algorithms in game theory goes a long way back. In particular, several authors24 have 
analyzed the play of non-cooperative games and their equilibria when finite automata play the 
game as models of rational players with limited memory and reasoning capacity. Such capacity 
                                                          
were developed primarily to oversee human decision makers. Many observers have argued that our current 
frameworks are not well-adapted for situations in which a potentially incorrect, unjustified, or unfair outcome 
emerges from a computer. » - p. 636. However, in a recent intervention, M. Ohlhausen (2017), Acting Chairman, 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, stated that from an antitrust perspective, the expanding use of algorithms raises 
familiar issues that are well within the existing canon (i.e., within the existing competition legislation and policy).  
19  See e.g., Kaplow (2011) for an analysis of some of these concepts and others, such as ‘conspiracy’, ‘collusion’, 
‘parallelism’, and ‘conscious parallelism’. Behind the concept of “meeting of the minds” is, or at least seems to 
be, the well-defined concept of “common knowledge” in game theory. About this latter concept, see e.g., 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1991). See Aumann (1976) for a mathematical definition of “common knowledge”, starting 
with some probability space on the “states of the world”, and using the topological notions of join and meet of 
sets. See also Lewis (2002) for a more philosophical discussion of this concept. 
20  The term ‘Autonomous Artificial Agent’ is used by Harrington and is defined as ‘a software program that carries 
out a set of operations on behalf of a human agent without intervention by this agent, and does so with some 
knowledge of the human agent’s objective’ – see Harrington (2018), p. 7. 
21  See e.g., Mehra (2016), and Harrington (2018). 
22  See M. Vestager (2017). 
23  See Gal & Elkin-Koren (2017), pp. 346/7, albeit these two authors discuss ‘plus factors’ in the context of consumer 
algorithms. See also Gal (2018), p. 37. A ‘plus factor’ is to be understood as additional economic circumstantial 
evidence that, together with parallel conduct by different firms, e.g., a parallel movement in prices, can merit an 
investigation under antitrust legislation – see Kovacic et al. (2011). Such investigation is merited when all 
alternative explanations for such parallel movement, but for some sort of agreement between firms, are non-
credible. See also Chopra & White (2011) and Buyers (2018) for a discussion of artificial Intelligence liability.  
24  See Rubinstein (1986, 1998), Gilboa (1988), and Kalai (1990), among other authors. See also Conlisk (1996). 




can be measured by the number of states in each finite automaton25. The study of algorithms as 
collusive devices has been somewhat more recent26. 
In a recent paper, Salcedo (2015) explores a symmetric dynamic model of price competition with 
two firms, where firms choose pricing algorithms (henceforth, PA’s) simultaneously and 
independently at the beginning of the repeated game. He shows that when four conditions are 
met simultaneously, namely, firms set prices through algorithms that can respond to market 
conditions, these algorithms are fixed in the short run, can be decoded by the rival, and can be 
revised over time, then every equilibrium of the game leads in the long run to monopolistic, or 
collusive, profits. He claims his findings provide theoretical support for the idea that optimal use 
of PAs is an effective tool for tacit collusion and that the similar results will be attained in the 
context of general repeated games and not just a pricing duopoly. 
In another recent paper, T. Klein (2018) shows how in a stylized duopoly environment with a 
homogeneous good, unrestricted production capacity, and with repeated sequential price 
competition, independent ‘Q-learning algorithms’ are able to achieve higher-than static prices 
and profits. According to the author, his result provides ground for competition authorities and 
regulators to remain vigilant when observing the rise of autonomous PAs in the marketplace, in 
particular in cases where firms may be short-run price committed. He also claims that the 
general framework used in the paper may be used to similarly assess the capacity of other, 
perhaps more advanced algorithms to collude in various environments.  
In another paper, Calvano et al. (2018a) put forth five important questions, namely: (i) Can 
“smart” PAs learn to collude? (ii) Is collusion among algorithms any different from collusion 
among humans? (iii) In particular, is algorithmic pricing conducive to collusion more often than 
what humans could do? If the answers to these questions are affirmative, further issues will 
arise: (iv) How can we detect algorithmic collusion? (v) What are the appropriate new standards 
for competition policy? 
In my paper I deal with questions (iv) e (v). If the answer to questions (i) and (ii) is a clear ‘no’, 
then there is not much to say that has not been said before. Hence, my paper is only relevant if 
we cannot give such a clear negative answer to both questions.  
The authors also distinguish between ‘adaptive algorithms’ and ‘learning algorithms’, claiming 
that the serious challenges to current competition legislation and policy come from the latter. 
As referred in their paper, and contrary to ‘adaptive algorithms’, learning (pricing) algorithms 
are ‘active learners’, as they are ‘willing’ to adopt strategies that may be suboptimal so as to 
learn from experience. A learning algorithm “learns to play optimally from experience”, which 
gives such algorithms an advantage over adaptive algorithms in more complex environments. 
This also allows them to reach a collusive equilibrium without being designed to do so. Through 
the simulation of a repeated game played by two ‘Q-learning’ algorithms, representing two 
competing firms playing a prisoner’s dilemma game with strategies ‘Price High’ and Price Low’ 
                                                          
25  See annex for a formal definition of ‘finite automaton’, or Lewis & Papadimitriou (1981). The finite automata that 
implement pre-defined repeated game strategies are ‘Moore machines’, as their output is not necessarily binary 
– see annex. There are ways of measuring the complexity of Moore machines other than just their number of 
states. E.g., the Moore machine implementing the “grim trigger strategy” in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma game can be regarded as simpler than the one implementing “tit-for-tat”. In fact, both machines have 
two states but the transition function is simpler for the “grim trigger” strategy. 
26  See additional discussion in Schwalbe (2018). 




and with a one-period memory27, the authors show that even if it takes some time for Q-learning 
algorithms to ‘realize’ that collusion can be profitable, collusion will occur most of the time, even 
if some experimentation periods will occur when the algorithms engage in a “price war”. 
Both Klein and Salcedo employ in their work ‘Q-learning algorithms’. These algorithms are 
examples of model-free active reinforcement learning agents28. They learn the value of taking a 
certain action a in a state s, where this value, called Q-value, is directly related to a payoff U(·), 
which is a function of state s29. However, in both papers the very large number of time periods 
required for ‘Q-learning algorithms’ to explore their environment and learn to adequately 
balance their dual functions of ‘exploitation’ (reaping benefits) and ‘exploration’ (learning), is 
typically far greater than the frequency with which firms interact in most markets and carry out 
effective price changes. It is possible that more sophisticated algorithms can learn more and 
learn faster30. Calvano et al. (2018a) discuss these possibilities as well, including communication 
between algorithms. 
 
III. ‘Preventing Algorithmic Collusion’ 
Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium 
outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously from any instructions by human agents, have 
also opened the possibility for some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type 
of algorithms being used by firms. As referred by Mehra (2016), «Looking further into the future, 
regulators may need to develop the ability to test and probe the effects of algorithmic sales on 
consumers; agencies may need to conduct their own ‘algorithmic enforcement’»31. And, as 
already mentioned, to regard the use of algorithms, or some types of algorithms, as ‘plus factors’ 
to ‘an agreement’ between firms employing such algorithms32, possibly in an ex-post evaluation. 
Calvano et al. (2018a) distinguish three possible policy approaches to the risk of algorithmic 
collusion. A total ban on the use of algorithms is set rightfully aside is an unreasonable approach. 
The first approach takes ‘business-as-usual’, where algorithmic pricing is regarded as not posing 
any new problem that cannot be dealt with by current antitrust legislation. In particular, the 
legal distinction between tacit and explicit collusion is maintained, as attempting to sanction 
tacit collusion would remain subject to unreasonably high type I and II errors. The second 
approach calls for an ex-ante regulation, or supervision, of PAs, to be carried out by a regulatory 
(or competition) agency. This agency would have the power to prohibit certain PAs that 
exhibited a ‘tendency to collude’, a characteristic that would have to be defined in a precise and 
rational way, not least for the sake of legal certainty. As we will see, this second approach is also 
                                                          
27  The common time discount factor equals 0.995, the learning rate equals 0.15, and the experimentation rate is 
constant and equals 0.04. 
28  It is worth mentioning that reinforcement learning models have been developed in game theory for many years. 
They attempt to model the behavior of less than fully rational economic agents who interact strategically, and 
where equilibria, when they exist, arise as long-run outcomes of this interaction. Players learn to improve their 
strategic choices as they play the game period after period - see Fudenberg & Levine (1998). 
29  See Russell & Norvig (2016), chs. 17 and 21, for a more extensive discussion of “Q-learning algorithms”. 
30  It is worth mentioning that in infinitely repeated (non-cooperative) games, the computation of best-response 
strategies may not be trivial, and can be quite complex – see e.g., Gilboa (1988), Ben Porath (1990), and 
Papadimitriou (1992). 
31  See Mehra (2016), p. 1331. 
32  See e.g., Harrington (2018); Calvano et al. (2018a); Gal (May 2017, and 2018); Mehra (2016); Ezrachi & Stucke 
(2016); T. Klein (2018). 




favored by Harrington (2018). The third approach calls for an ex-post regulation, or control, the 
same way competition agencies currently deal with antitrust practices, but under legal 
standards somewhat different from the current ones33. Perhaps these standards would take a 
more assertive, yet careful stance towards ‘tacit collusion’. Calvano et al. (2018a) seem to favor 
this third approach, where the legal distinction between tacit and explicit collusion would have 
to be reassessed. 
Harrington (2018) draws a distinction between the current legal doctrine on collusion by human 
agents and the situation where prices are set by autonomous artificial agents (AAs)34. In this 
latter case, the strategy determining the price to be charged is written down in the algorithm’s 
code which means that it can, in principle, be accessed, contrary to the mind of a colluding 
manager. Based on this crucial distinction, this author proposes that liability be defined by a per 
se prohibition of certain PAs that support supra-competitive prices, so as to make collusion by 
AAs unlawful. Liability would be determined by an examination of a pricing algorithm’s (PA) code 
to determine whether it is a prohibited PA, or by entering data into the PA and monitoring the 
output in terms of prices to determine whether the algorithm exhibits a prohibited property35. 
As stated, ideally the liability rule would prohibit all algorithms that promote collusion, and 
would exclude from such prohibition all algorithms that promote efficiency36. I.e., an ideal 
liability rule would allow the decision maker not to commit errors of type I and type II. A realistic 
alternative would be to design or choose a liability rule that would allow for the maximization 
of Likelihood Ratio 𝐿𝑅(𝑃𝑃𝐴) ≝ (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝐼]) ÷  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼]37. Harrington 
proceeds by drawing a broad outline of a three-step research program to identify which PAs will 
be prohibited, as follows: 
Step 1: (1.i) Create a simulated market setting with learning algorithms that produce collusion 
and competition as outcomes; (1.ii) Keep track of when competitive prices emerge and when 
supra-competitive prices emerge; (1.iii) Perform this exercise with different learning algorithms 
and for a variety of market conditions. 
Step 2: (2.i) Inspect or test the resulting pricing algorithms for the purpose of identifying those 
properties that are present when supra-competitive prices emerge but are not present when 
                                                          
33  See Calvano et al. (2018a), pp. 14/15. 
34  In Harrington, an AA is composed of two elements: a ‘pricing algorithm’ that prescribes what price to charge 
depending on the history of the (repeated) game played by the various firms competing in the same market; and 
a ‘learning algorithm’ that chooses and modifies the pricing algorithm based on a pricing algorithm’s performance 
relative to the performance of other pricing algorithms. When the co-domain, or at least the range, of a strategy 
in a game has more than two elements, then a FA implementing it is a Moore machine, a generalization of the 
basic FA – see annex for a definition of a Moore machine. 
35  See ‘white-box settings’ and ‘black-box settings’ in Desai & Kroll (2018).  
36  Following Harrington (2018), let pa denote a "pricing algorithm" and PPA denote the set of prohibited pricing 
algorithms. Given a specification of PPA, Prob [pa ∈ PPA|pa is collusive] is the probability that a pricing algorithm 
is determined to be in the prohibited set when the pricing algorithm is collusive. Prob [pa ∈ PPA |pa is 
competitive] is the probability that a pricing algorithm is determined to be in the prohibited set when the pricing 
algorithm is competitive. Ideally, Prob [pa ∈ PPA|pa is collusive] = 1 and Prob [pa ∈ PPA |pa is competitive] = 0 
so that a pricing algorithm is concluded to be unlawful if and only if it is collusive. That is, ideally, errors type I and 
type II would be zero. That such an ideal is not reached will be due to misspecification of set PPA - some collusive 
pricing algorithms are excluded from PPA or some competitive pricing algorithms are included - or incomplete 
data or inadequate methods for evaluating whether a particular pricing algorithm is in PPA. 
37  Where (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝐼]) = 1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑝𝑎 ∉  𝑃𝑃𝐴|𝑝𝑎 is collusive], and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼] =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑝𝑎 ∈  𝑃𝑃𝐴 |𝑝𝑎 is competitive], and where 𝑃𝑃𝐴 denotes the collection of prohibited pricing algorithms. 




competitive prices emerge, (2.ii) Pricing algorithms with those properties will have a high 
likelihood ratio and thus be a candidate for the set of prohibited pricing algorithms. 
Step 3: Test the effect of prohibiting a set of pricing algorithms. This would be done by re-running 
the learning algorithms in the simulated market setting but where the learning algorithms are 
constrained not to select pricing algorithms in the prohibited set. The aim is to test whether 
supra-competitive prices are less frequently set and competitive prices are not distorted. If so, 
then the prohibition of some pricing algorithms would make lower prices more frequent, with a 
corresponding increase in social welfare. 
Harrington’s three step research program can be applied both ex-ante as well as ex-post, i.e., as 
a prevention tool or a sanctioning tool. Nevertheless, its wording suggests an ex-ante approach. 
Clearly, this research program can be carried out for some subset of all possible inputs that can 
be fed into the different algorithms. But this subset can be smaller than necessary. This can be 
a serious limitation to the efficacy of such research program. 
Other authors have similarly called for some sort of regulation, assessment or auditing of 
algorithms as a way to prevent or sanction ‘algorithmic collusion’38. 
We can then pose the following questions: Do these approaches define the way forward? More 
generally, can competition and/or regulatory agencies rise to the challenge M. Gal encapsulates 
when she recommends that “’smart coordination’ by suppliers requires ‘smart regulation’”?39 
What type of regulation? And how smart can regulation be? The next two sections will explore 
this challenge, by appealing to recent literature on algorithms and the law and to the theory of 
computation.  
 
IV. Ex-ante regulation, self-regulation and their limits  
Given the multiplicity of algorithms firms can employ to implement pricing strategies, an ex-ante 
regulatory agency would be truly effective only if, when given any set/vector of algorithms, one 
or more per firm, it could ascertain whether they exhibited a “tendency to collude”, and if yes 
then prohibit their use. Apart from the existence of limits to such ascertainment, as we will see 
below, the property “tendency to collude” must be properly defined. For Harrington (2018) it 
means choosing PA’s that through their interaction, eventually result in supra-competitive 
prices. According to this author, the Finite Automata (FA’s) implementing the ‘tit-for-tat’ 
strategy or the ‘grim trigger’ strategy are good PA candidates to fulfill such property40. The 
regulatory agency would need to define its own understanding in a clear and transparent way 
to minimize legal uncertainty and the probability of committing errors types I and II, through the 
collection of as much relevant information as possible.  
Pricing algorithms themselves can become quite complex. Consider the infinitely repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma game (IRPD) as the paradigm for the strategic interaction between two 
potentially colluding firms in a market. The ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy can be implemented by a very 
simple FA with two states and a straightforward transition function. The ‘grim trigger’ strategy 
                                                          
38  See Calvano et al. (2018a), pp. 14-16; Gal (May 2017) p. 6, through the creation of an “internal algorithmic police”; 
Mehra (2016), Part IV; Ezrachi & Stucke (2016), p. 21; Gal (2018), p. 39; T. Klein (2018), p. 14. See also Schwalbe 
(2018), pp. 21-23. 
39  See Gal (2018), p. 25. 
40  Note that in Harrington (2018), the prohibition is applied to PAs, not to learning algorithms themselves. 




is also implementable by a FA with two states and an even simpler transition function. Both 
these strategies played by both players in the IRPD game can support (price) collusion as a 
subgame perfect equilibrium, provided certain conditions are satisfied. Similar strategies in an 
oligopoly game with more than two players can also support (price) collusion as a subgame 
perfect equilibrium, under certain conditions. But so can infinitely denumerable41 many other 
vectors of more complex strategies, implementable by FA, with more states and more complex 
transition functions. 
The regulatory agency could also attempt to identify families of ‘learning algorithms’ (typically, 
one learning algorithm per firm) such that when they play an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, 
they will eventually learn to collude. Each of these algorithms receives as input in each period 
publicly available relevant market data, such as prices charged by the different firms (through 
PAs) which, together with information on its own firm’s costs, profit levels, and possibly other 
types of data, will choose a PA to be applied for a certain number of time periods. Whether each 
‘learning algorithm’ will eventually learn to decode other ‘learning algorithms’ in the repeated 
game, even if only partially so, might also become possible. 
An ever-increasing complexity of algorithms employed by firms would pose a serious challenge 
to the regulatory agency. Prohibited algorithms could be replaced by new ones that could either 
escape an ex-ante assessment altogether - depending on how easily any such prohibition could 
be circumvented - or, if not, burden yet again the regulatory agency, which would be pressed to 
decide in a timely fashion, lest it delay the use of efficiency enhancing algorithms. 
It seems reasonable then to ask what kind of regulatory agency would have the information and 
knowledge required to ascertain the properties of ever evolving sets of algorithms submitted 
for its evaluation, while at the same time controlling for errors type I and II 42. 
In face of such a demanding task, could this regulatory agency itself employ a “meta-algorithm” 
that could do the job, i.e., accept or reject any set of algorithms under submission, once the 
criteria for prohibition is clearly defined? Not only would such a “meta-algorithm”, still being an 
algorithm, never commit type I and II errors - these could only come from ill-defined prohibition 
criteria -, but its computational capabilities could surpass any human regulator’s computational 
capabilities, unless one is prepared to boldly assert otherwise, as it could question the validity 
of the ‘Church-Turing Thesis’, discussed below. 
If we accept the Church-Turing Thesis43, which states that Turing Machines (TMs) are formal 
versions of algorithms, and that no computational procedure can be considered an algorithm 
unless it can be presented as a TM, then, such “meta-algorithm” would be a TM, as are all the 
                                                          
41  When applied to a set, the term “infinitely denumerable”, which is equivalent to the term “infinitely countable”, 
means that the cardinality of that set equals the cardinality of the set ℕ of natural numbers. In contrast, the set 
ℝ of all real numbers is uncountable. 
42  Maybe competition agencies would consider useful to issue of guidelines on the use of algorithms by firms in the 
market, along the lines of what happens with the application of Article 101(3) of TFEU, where ‘block exemptions’ 
were created, or with the notion of ‘hard core restrictions’, such as RPM, as included in the 2010 EC guidelines on 
vertical restrictions (EC Guidelines on Vertical Restrictions, OJEU C130/01, 19.05.2010). 
43  See Lewis & Papadimitriou (1981) for a presentation of this thesis or conjecture. See also “Church’s Thesis” in 
Davis & Weyuker (1983). Sometimes, the ‘Church-Turing Thesis’ is presented as follows: The Universal Turing 
Machine can perform any calculation that any ‘human computer’ can carry out. By ‘human computer’ one means 
a human being using his/her own mind and any other tools to perform any type of computation. Note that this 
‘Church-Turing Thesis’ is not presented as a theorem, as it is not a mathematical result. It may be disproved in the 
future. However, according to most scholars that is quite unlikely to happen. 




algorithms we have been talking about. And it would represent an upper bound to the 
computational capabilities of any human regulator, endowing the regulator with the means to 
perform its job. This job could be extended to allow the characterization of a particular 
algorithm, or set of algorithms, as “plus factor(s)” to ‘an agreement’ between firms employing 
such algorithms. 
Since ‘algorithmic collusion’ is a possible outcome from the interaction of several algorithms, 
typically one per firm, that the regulator wants to prevent, the meta-algorithm would be 
simulating their interaction for any given data set that includes prices, costs and other 
information relevant for the pursuit of the firms’ ultimate goals. In other words, this meta-
algorithm is best interpreted as a Universal Turing Machine (UTM)44. 
Having reached this point we are confronted with the following: 
Result 1: There is no such meta-algorithm which, when presented with a set of algorithms, one 
per firm, together with any data set, suitably encoded, is able to decide whether they belong to 
the set of algorithms that should be prohibited. [A line of proof for this result is given in annex 
1] 
In other words, the “ex-ante algorithmic assessment problem”, as characterized above, is 
unsolvable45. I believe that this result sets a limit on how “smart” and “transparent” ex-ante 
regulation of PAs can be, and casts some doubt over the efficacy of such regulation. 
In contrast with Harrington (2018), I am redefining the class of algorithms that may be prohibited 
per se as learning algorithms and not PAs. In Harrington’s set up ‘PAs’ are chosen by ‘learning 
algorithms’ as the infinitely repeated oligopoly game under analysis unfolds. In any case, all 
these different types of algorithms can be interpreted as Turing Machines. Therefore, the above 
result still would apply. 
Note that this result does not say that for any given algorithm or set of algorithms there does 
not exist a “meta-algorithm” that is able to decide whether they should be prohibited or not. 
What it says is that there is no ‘meta-algorithm’ that can decide whether or not any algorithm 
or set of algorithms should be prohibited46. Therefore, a certain meta-algorithm may do the job 
for a particular algorithm or set of algorithms but may be unable to do the job for another 
particular algorithm or set of algorithms. This lack of robustness may question the viability of an 
ex-ante assessment exercise. 
The above impossibility result places serious limits to an ex-ante assessment exercise as 
seemingly proposed by some authors. Some will say that this is the price to pay for eschewing 
an assessment program that is allowed to commit errors type I and II, and that there is no need 
                                                          
44  See annex for a definition of a UTM. 
45  Desai & Kroll (2018) refer in their paper that the ‘Halting problem’ – see annex for a description of this problem - 
which is a well-known unsolvable problem in the theory of computation, implies that several other interesting 
problems are also unsolvable. And that these inherent limits to solvability indicate that «insofar as law and policy 
seeks a general transparency tool that analyzes all disclosed algorithms for compliance with desired norms, such 
a tool will not be possible». See also Kroll et al. (2017). Note that Rice’s Theorem (1953), which I use to prove the 
above result – see annex - generalizes the theorem that states the insolvability of the ‘Halting problem’ (due to 
Alan Turing, 1936-7) – see Rogers (1987), p. 34. I used Rice’s Theorem in another context more than twenty years 
ago – see Gata (1995). Kroll et al. (2017) make a reference to this theorem on p. 652, relating it to the Halting 
problem. 
46  Using First Order Predicate Calculus (or First Order Logic), the result can be stated along the following lines: 
¬ ∃ 𝑇𝑀: ∀ (… ). Which does not mean it is not true that: ∀ (… ) ∃ 𝑇𝑀: (… ).  




to pay such a heavy price. Maybe Harrington’s three step research program, together with a 
definition of liability that maximizes the Likelihood Ratio 𝐿𝑅(𝑃𝑃𝐴) points us in the right 
direction. 
As a realistic alternative to never committing errors type I and II, Harrington proposes the 
maximization of the likelihood ratio 𝐿𝑅(𝑃𝑃𝐴) ≝ (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝐼]) ÷  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼], 
where 𝐿𝑅(𝑃𝑃𝐴) measures the efficacy of a particular definition of liability. In order to calculate 
such ratio, one will need to define a probability measure on the sample space Ω of all pricing 
algorithms 𝑃𝐴. If we do not restrict at the outset the set of allowed pricing algorithms to be FA 
(more precisely, Moore machines) with at most two-states, then the space Ω is infinite. For 
example, we can take the strategy “tit-for-tat” in the IRPD Game and build another (supergame) 
strategy, call it 𝜑𝑛, where, in the first period of the game the player cooperates, and after a 
deviation by the other player, this player deviates as well for 𝑛 consecutive periods, where 𝑛 ≥
2. For each number 𝑛, there is a high enough time discount factor 1/(1 + 𝑟) for both players such 
that, under perfect information (a sufficient but not a necessary condition), the pair of strategies 
(“tit-for-tat”; 𝜑𝑛) constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium supporting cooperation/collusion in 
every period of the IRPD game. Clearly, there are infinitely many (supergame) strategies 𝜑𝑛, 
where 𝑛 ≥ 2. That the space Ω is infinite but denumerable results from the well-known fact that 
the set of all algorithms (or TMs), of which Ω is a (strict) subset, is an infinitely denumerable set.  
Assume now we can partition the space Ω into two disjoint subsets 𝑃𝑃𝐴 and Ω ∖ 𝑃𝑃𝐴, where 𝑃𝑃𝐴 
denotes the set of all prohibited pricing algorithms. Hence, all pricing algorithms in set Ω ∖ 𝑃𝑃𝐴 
are not prohibited (by the regulatory agency). Assume as well we can partition the space Ω into 
the disjoint subsets {𝑝𝑎 is collusive} and {𝑝𝑎 is competitive}, where ‘competitive’ means ‘not 
collusive’. Then, one can (theoretically) define the conditional probabilities 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑝𝑎 ∉  𝑃𝑃𝐴|𝑝𝑎 is collusive] and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑝𝑎 ∈  𝑃𝑃𝐴 |𝑝𝑎 is competitive]. However, can we 
decide whether any pricing algorithm 𝑝𝑎 is in the set 𝑃𝑃𝐴 ? More precisely, is there an algorithm 
(TM) that decides membership in set 𝑃𝑃𝐴? The same query can be asked about the subset 
{𝑝𝑎 is competitive}. 
Result 2: The answer to both these questions is negative – see annex 1 for a line of proof. This 
means none of the conditional probabilities is computable.  
Since (1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝐼]) = 1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑝𝑎 ∉  𝑃𝑃𝐴|𝑝𝑎 is collusive], and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼] =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑝𝑎 ∈  𝑃𝑃𝐴 |𝑝𝑎 is competitive], it follows that likelihood ratio given by (1 −
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝐼]) ÷  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼], is a non-computable function47. Hence, its 
maximization is an unsolvable problem. Of course, we do not expect the different jurisdictions 
to actually go through this type of maximization problem when attempting to define liability. 
Most likely, how liability is defined can be better understood as the result of a learning process 
by the jurisdiction itself over several years of law enforcement. In any case, the above result 
                                                          
47  Given a probability space (Ω, ℱ, 𝑃) and a sub-sigma-algebra ℬ of ℱ, the conditional probability 𝑃(𝐴|ℬ) of a 
measurable subset 𝐴 ∈ ℱ is defined as the conditional expectation 𝐸(𝐴|ℬ) of indicator function 𝑖𝐴 of subset 𝐴 
given ℬ. I.e., 𝑃(𝐴|ℬ) ≝ 𝐸(𝐴|ℬ), ∀𝐴 ∈ ℱ. The conditional probability 𝑃(∙ |ℬ) is a mapping Ω × ℱ → [0,1] ⊂ ℝ. A 
conditional probability 𝑃(∙ |ℬ) is called regular if (∀𝜔 ∈ Ω ): 𝑃(∙ |ℬ)(𝜔) is also a probability measure. Assuming 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼] ≠ 0, the above defined likelihood ratio is a function mapping Ω × ℱ into → [0, +∞), given 
the probability space (Ω, ℱ, 𝑃), where Ω is the set (space) of all pricing algorithms, ℱ is a 𝜎-algebra in Ω, and 𝑃 is 
a probability measure. 




raises doubts on how far we can go in controlling for the efficacy of any definition of liability in 
competition law. 
On a self-regulatory option, notice that at any point in time each firm may only know the 
algorithms it employs to carry out its market strategies48, but not necessarily the algorithms 
employed by other firms operating in the market. Which means that each firm will not be able 
to simulate with a high enough degree of accuracy how its own algorithms will behave period 
after period as they interact with other algorithms. Unless each firm engages in repeated 
simulation exercises by assuming different sets/vectors of algorithms that may be used by other 
firms. Which could be quite costly and not very informative. Under such limited information 
scenario, self-regulation may not be an effective enough option to meet the standards imposed 
by a competition or regulatory agency. 
 
V. Ex-post auditing and sanctioning and its limits 
 
In an ex-post situation, i.e., when a specific ex-post investigation is opened49, we assume a given 
set of algorithms employed by the different firms will be analyzed by the regulatory/competition 
agency. It is likely this investigation will involve simulating the behavior of those algorithms as 
they are given as input data on relevant variables such as prices. Such data, at least in part, are 
produced period after period by the algorithms themselves, as their output while they run in an 
interactive way. The aim will be to compare the output from such simulations to the output 
observed in the market and decide whether it can be established with a high enough degree of 
certainty there was algorithmic price collusion50.  
Desai & Kroll (2018), Kroll et al. (2017), and other authors, discuss different approaches for 
testing and evaluating algorithms51. For example, ‘White-box testing’ is a method for analyzing 
software that tests internal structures or workings of an application. It is a method to test an 
application at the level of the ‘source code’52. ‘Black-box testing’ is a method for software testing 
                                                          
48  Assume that to know an algorithm might mean to know some, but not necessarily all, of its relevant 
characteristics.  
49  In the EU, Article 101 (TFEU) cases can originate in: (1) a complaint, (2) opening of an own–initiative investigation, 
(3) information reported by individuals via the "whistleblower" tool, or (4) a leniency application from one of the 
participants to a cartel. – see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_101_en.html. Recall that 
Article 101 (TFEU) prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. Regulation 1/2003 introduced a 
system of decentralized ex post enforcement, in which the European Commission and the national competition 
authorities of the EU Member States forming together the European Competition Network (ECN), pursue 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 102 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
50  In a more recent paper, Calvano et al. (2018b) create an environment to analyze the interaction among a number 
of ‘Q-learning algorithms’ in the context of an oligopoly model of price competition with Logit demand and 
constant marginal costs. They show that «algorithms consistently learn to charge supra-competitive prices, 
without communicating with each other. The high prices are sustained by classical collusive strategies with a finite 
punishment phase followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or 
demand and to changes in the number of players». 
51  Kroll and Desai & Kroll do mention computational unsolvability in the legal context of algorithmic transparency. 
My goal is to explore the limits that are imposed by computational unsolvability on ex-ante and ex-post antitrust 
policy in the specific context of algorithmic collusion.  
52  According to the Linux Information Project52, ‘source code’ is defined as the version of software as it is originally 
written (i.e., typed into a computer) by a human in plain text (i.e., human readable alphanumeric characters) - 
see http://www.linfo.org/ 




that examines the functionality of an application without peering into its internal structures or 
workings. Both types of testing can follow methods: (1) static methods, which look at the code 
without running the program; and (2) dynamic methods, which run the program and assess the 
outputs for particular inputs or the state of the program as it is running53. Nevertheless, and as 
pointed out by Desai & Kroll, these testing methods cannot escape the unsolvability of the 
‘Halting Problem’.  
Apart from ‘White-box testing’ and ‘Black-box testing’, Desai & Kroll (2018) analyze a third way 
to test software and algorithms, namely “Ex-post Analysis and Oversight”. This approach may 
have several appealing features but as recognized by the authors, «software that uses certain 
types of machine learning or is modified frequently by or is modified frequently by its operators 
to respond and adapt to dynamic inputs and user behavior, are not addressed well by the 
solutions presented [‘white-box testing’, ‘black-box testing’, “ex-post analysis and oversight]. 
Many systems change often, either because of regular changes by designers or because they use 
automated processes such as online machine learning models which “can update their 
predictions after each decision, incorporating each new observation as part of their training 
data.” The approach of creating an audit log showing that everyone is subject to the same 
decision policy is less useful when systems are dynamic and change over time because the system 
may (desirably) change between decisions». The type of algorithms that are raising concerns in 
the enforcement of antitrust law are exactly learning algorithms that can update their 
predictions after each decision, incorporating each new observation as part of their training 
data. 
 
To competition law and economics scholars and practitioners, it still seems unclear how efficient 
can ex-post auditing and sanctioning become when dealing with algorithms as facilitators of 
collusive behavior in repeated games, and with increasingly sophisticated algorithms that can 
interact as autonomous implementers of pricing strategies, learning to collude without any 
explicit instructions provided by human agents. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
To what extent can competition policy keep a distinction between tacit and explicit collusion? 
To the difficulties pointed out by L. Kaplow (2011), namely on a consensual and precise definition 
of the concept “agreement”, the increasing use of “smart algorithms” may introduce additional 
challenges as these type of algorithms can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased 
blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion – see also Harrington (2018). 
As shown by some authors in very recent work – see Calvano et al. (2018a,b) - the interaction 
among Q-learning algorithms in the context of an oligopoly model of price competition, these 
algorithms consistently learn to charge supra-competitive prices, without communicating with 
each other. The high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite punishment phase 
                                                          
53  As referred by Kroll et al. (2017, p. 646/7), «Computer scientists evaluate [computer] programs using two testing 
methodologies: (1) static methods, which look at the code without running the program; and (2) dynamic methods, 
which run the program and assess the outputs for particular inputs or the state of the program as it is running. 
Dynamic methods can be divided into (a) observational methods in which an analyst can see how the program 
runs in the field with its natural inputs; and (b) testing methods, which are more powerful, where an analyst 
chooses inputs and submits them to the program». 




followed by a gradual return to cooperation. Hence, we might not be any more in the realm of 
science fiction. 
How reliable and effective can be an ex-ante supervision and control exercised over algorithms? 
How reliable and effective cab be an ex-post auditing and sanctioning of collusive algorithms? I 
show that computational unsolvability casts some doubts over how efficient both these 
approaches can become54. 
Nevertheless, software testing is carried out routinely – as shown by Desai & Kroll (2018) and by 
Kroll et al. (2017) -, and we may simply acknowledge that the way liability is defined and the way 
ensuing regulation and sanctioning are exercised rely on a “learning-by-doing” approach and 
accept that errors type I and II will be committed, as a price to pay for getting away from non-
decidability or computational unsolvability. However, it seems we have little clue about the 
magnitude of such errors. Which in turn may affect how productive the “learning-by-doing” 
approach may be. Moreover, the ongoing research on various challenges current software 
systems pose will likely have an impact on how to deal with the legal challenges referred above. 
Competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary 
collaboration with computer science and mathematics. Some familiarity with computability, 
computational complexity and, I would venture to say, with the theory of languages and 
grammars, may help scholars working in competition law and economics to better face the legal 
challenges posed by artificial intelligence. A refinement of some legal concepts could very well 







                                                          
54  Notice that the use of “quantum TM” does not make solvable a problem that is unsolvable using a non-quantum 
TM – see D. Deutsch (1985). 




Annex 1:  
Line of Proof (for Result 1): If we accept the Church-Turing Thesis (which states that Turing Machines 
(TMs) are formal versions of algorithms, and that no computational procedure can be considered an 
algorithm unless it can be presented as a TM – see Lewis & Papadimitriou, ch.5), a ‘learning algorithm’ 
(LA) can be regarded as a TM. In each period a LA will receive as input some data on prices, costs, and 
other relevant parameters. Given this input (notice that these data can be coded, by use of Gödel 
numbers, into a single integer), the LA outputs a ‘pricing algorithm’ (that can be played by a FA or a TM). 
This pricing algorithm can also be coded into a single integer. Hence, the LA computes a function mapping 
integer numbers into integer numbers. The domain and codomain of such mapping are subsets of the set 
ℕ of natural numbers. This mapping is a partial recursive 1-ary function. Meaning that when an input is 
undefined (e.g., there are natural numbers which do not code any meaningful data) so is its output; and 
that this mapping is computable, i.e., recursive (which is by assumption). If we want some LA to be 
prohibited per se, it means that for certain inputs, they will compute, or output, unacceptable ‘pricing 
algorithms’. We can then say that each of these LA’s computes a partial recursive 1-ary function belonging 
to a certain “forbidden” or “prohibited” set ℂ. Let ℊℂ denote the set of all codes where each code uniquely 
identifies a partial recursive 1-ary function in set ℂ. Set ℊℂ is clearly non-empty (as there are acceptable 
pricing algorithms). And set ℊℂ is also different from the set ℕ of natural numbers (as there are 
unacceptable pricing algorithms, such as the ones implementing a grim-trigger strategy). I.e., ∅ ≠ ℊℂ ≠ 
ℕ. Then, by H. G. Rice’s Theorem (1953) – see below -, set ℊℂ is not recursive, i.e., there is no ‘algorithm’ 
that decides membership in this set. Therefore, there is no ‘algorithmic judge’ that, when presented with 
a LA, will be always able to decide whether this LA should be prohibited or not.  
 
It is easy to extend the previous result and proof to the case when a vector of TM’s are to be subject to 
analysis and judgement by an “algorithmic regulator/supervisor”. A vector of 𝓃 TM’s can given as an input 
to n Universal Turing Machine (UTM) through their Gödel numbers. Or just encode each of the 𝓃 TM’s 
into a Gödel number ℊ𝑖  and then encode the resulting vector of 𝓃 Gödel numbers as follows: 
[ℊ1,  ℊ2,  … , ℊ𝓃] = ∏ 𝑝𝑖
ℊ𝑖𝓃
𝑖=1 , where 𝑝𝑖  are prime numbers. Give also as input to the UTM the data that is 
to be given to the 𝓃 TM’s. And let the UTM simulate the calculations carried out by the 𝓃 TM’s.  
 
Line of Proof (for Result 2): It follows from Result 1, by use of Rice’s Theorem. As there is no algorithm 
that decides membership in set 𝑃𝑃𝐴, there is no algorithm that decides membership in its complement, 
i.e.,  in the set of all PA’s such that {𝑃𝐴 is competitive}. 
 
Theorem by H. G. Rice (1953): Let 𝒟 be a set of partial recursive one-ary functions. And let 𝒢𝒟 be denote 
the set {𝑛 ∈ ℕ: 𝜑𝑛 
1 ∈ 𝒟}. If ∅ ≠ 𝒢𝒟 ≠ ℕ then the set 𝒢𝒟 is not recursive - see H. Rogers (1987), or M. Davis 
& E. Weyuker (1983) for a statement and proof of Rice’s Theorem. 
Rice’s Theorem basically states that in computational theory, all non-trivial (i.e., neither true nor false for 
every computable function) semantic (i.e., behavior) properties of algorithms/computer programs are 










Annex 2:  
A Finite Automaton (FA) is a simple computational model with a fixed memory. It can be defined as a 5-
tuple (𝑆, 𝛴,  𝛿,  𝑠0, 𝐹),  where 𝑆 is the set of states of the machine, 𝛴 is the input alphabet, 𝛿: 𝑆 × 𝛴 → 𝑆 is 
the transition function, 𝑠0 is the  initial state, and 𝐹 is the set of final (or accepting) states, where 𝐹 ⊆ 𝑆. 
 
A useful way of looking at a FA is to regard it as a simple ‘language recognition device’. When we feed any 
string 𝑥 of symbols (over an alphabet) to an FA, the device (FA) can either end up in an ‘accepting state’ 
or not. If it does, we say this string has been accepted, or recognized, by the device (FA). The set of all 
strings accepted by an FA represents the ‘language’ accepted by this FA. Another way to look at an FA is 
to regard it as a simple computing device with a fixed (finite) capacity central processing unit (CPU), with 
no auxiliary memory, and where its output is binary (0 or 1, Yes or No). 
 
There are several variations and extensions of the notion of FA, such as an FA with output. For example, 
a Moore machine is defined as a 6-tuple (𝑆, 𝛴,  𝛥, 𝛿,  𝜆, 𝑠0), where 𝑆, 𝛴,  𝛿,  and 𝑠0 are defined as before, 
and where 𝛥 is the output alphabet and 𝜆: 𝑆 → 𝛥 is the output function. An FA can then be seen as a 
Moore machine where the output alphabet 𝛥 = {0,1} ,  and where state s is ‘accepting’ if and only if 
𝜆 (𝑠) = 1.   
 
A Turing Machine (TM) is a very general model of a computer (a CPU, plus an auxiliary memory and an 
input/output device). It is a computing device with an unbounded and unrestricted access memory. This 
feature sets the computational capability of a TM quite above the computational capability of a FA. 
Informally, a TM consists of: 
(1) A collection of distinct symbols called an alphabet A, and which includes a symbol called the ‘blank 
symbol’; 
(2) A tape, i.e., a "roll of paper" on which calculations are performed, which is divided into cells (or 
squares) and is infinite in both directions. At any given time during a "computation", all but a finite 
number of cells are "blank", i.e., contain the blank symbol; 
(3) A finite set of states. A state can be thought of as describing the internal configuration of the TM at 
any particular instant; 
(4) A read-write head which at any given time is scanning (i.e., reading) the contents of one cell of the 
tape, and is capable of replacing the symbol scanned by another symbol; 
(5) A finite ordered list of instructions. Each instruction either: 
(5.1) tells the computer to halt (i.e., stop) or, 
(5.2) tells the computer what next state to enter and tells the read-write head to do one of the 
following: 
(5.2.1) move one cell to the left; 
(5.2.2) move one cell to the right; 
(5.2.3) replace the symbol scanned by another symbol. 
 
Each TM can be thought of as a finite list of instructions. Each instruction describes the present status of 
the machine (i.e., the present state and the symbol being read by the tape head) and what the next step 
in the computation will be. To each TM we can assign a number (a positive integer) which uniquely 
identifies it. That is, to each TM we can associate a "code" number. But not every positive integer is the 
code for some TM.  
Formally, a Turing Machine is defined as a quadruple (𝐾, 𝛴, 𝑠0, 𝛿),  where 𝐾 is a finite set of states (of the 
machine) not containing the ‘halt state’ ℎ; 𝛴 is an alphabet, containing the blank symbol, but not 
containing the symbols L and R (for ‘Left’ and ‘Right’); 𝑠0 is the initial state; and 𝛿: 𝐾 × 𝛴 → (𝐾 ∪ {ℎ}) ×
(𝛴 ∪ {𝐿, 𝑅}) is the transition function. 
A Universal Turing Machine (UTM) is a TM that takes as arguments both the encoding 𝜌(ℳ) of any Turing 
Machine ℳ, and any input string 𝓌, and performs whatever operations on 𝓌 would have been 
performed by ℳ – see e.g., Lewis & Papadimitriou (1981), section 5.7. The encoding of any TM can follow 
the Gödel numbering system, itself based on the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, also called the 




Unique Factorization Theorem (due to C. F. Gauss, 1801), which states that: Any positive integer can be 
uniquely factored into a product of powers of prime numbers. 
A UTM can also take as arguments the encodings of 𝓃 Turing Machines, plus any input strings, one per 
TM, and simulate the interaction of these 𝓃 TMs when initiated with these input strings. 
The Halting Problem (when applied to TMs): Given an arbitrary Turing Machine ℳ and an arbitrary input 
𝓌, can it be determined whether this TM will eventually halt on input 𝓌? It can be shown that: Given an 
arbitrary Turing Machine ℳ and an arbitrary input 𝓌, there is no algorithm for determining whether 
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